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Abstract
The efficient supply of spare parts is of prime concern for OEMs. Next to the
traditional spare parts sources in form of final order and remanufacturing, the
option to buy back broken products prevents the OEM from fulfilling his spare
parts availability obligation in the end-of-life phase and increases his ability to
remanufacture. This contribution seeks to identify optimal buy-back strategies
for different settings regarding information availability and buy-back flexibility.
A numerical study analyzes circumstances under which buy-back is especially
beneficial for the OEM.
Keywords: Inventory Management, Spare Parts Management, Reverse Logis-
tics, Buy-back
1 Introduction
In recent years, original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) of durable goods identified
the after-sales market as one of their key business segments. For instance, Cohen et al.
(2006) provide results of a 1999 AMR Research report stating that by being active in
the aftermarket businesses could generate about 45% of their gross profits. Further-
more, by efficiently handling the supply of spare parts, a competitive advantage can be
established if the OEM provides a superior service to his customers, e.g. by guarantee-
ing the availability of spare parts during a comparably long service period. Thus, the
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length of the service period becomes an important strategic parameter for management.
This period is subdivided into two distinct phases, namely the normal phase and the
final phase. During the normal phase the primary product is manufactured and sold to
the customers. The final phase starts when serial production ceases and it lasts as long
as spare parts availability is guaranteed. Therefore, it is often considerably longer than
the production period. In the automotive sector, for instance, the final phase usually
lasts for 10-15 years. However, several OEMs provide a significantly longer availability
for their spare parts as the example of a 30 years service period for Mercedes-Benz cars
indicates.
In a recent paper, Kim and Park (2008) propose a model that allows to determine
the optimal length of the final phase. They argue that the marketing department seeks
to stimulate demand by offering a long period with guaranteed spare parts availability
as this signals a high quality of the product (see, e.g., Spence, 1977; Gal-Or, 1989).
Obviously, if the final phase would be determined without such considerations by only
accounting for the operational costs and revenues of service, it would often be chosen
considerably shorter. Our research basically focuses on situations in which both per-
spectives (marketing and operations) yield large differences in the length of the final
period and we propose an efficient method for spare parts management under those
circumstances.
From the OEM’s perspective, inventory management for spare parts differs consid-
erably from inventory management applied to manufacturing processes, mainly because
demand for spare parts is less predictable and highly dynamic on a comparably low
level (see, e.g., Kennedy et al., 2002; Huiskonen, 2001). In addition, options for re-
supply become increasingly rare during the final phase. While in the normal phase
production facilities of the primary product can be used, this efficient sourcing option
is often no longer recommendable in the final phase due to high fixed costs incurred for
a relatively small output. Thus, a frequently adopted strategy is to place a final order
at the time when regular production comes to an end. However, this is connected with
high stock levels resulting in large holding cost and a high obsolescence risk as all de-
mands occurring in the final phase need to be estimated beforehand. Extra production
represents an additional option in the final phase which in contrast to regular pro-
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duction is typically performed in small lots. Nonetheless, this option is under certain
circumstances prohibitively expensive or technically infeasible (see Hesselbach et al.,
2002, for a comprehensive overview on available options).
Obviously, there is a one-to-one correspondence between a spare part and the broken
component. This creates the opportunity to recover the broken part for later use as a
spare part. Part recovery, hence, can complement other sources of spare parts supply.
An overview on different recovery processing options is provided by Thierry et al. (1995)
including repair, refurbishing, and remanufacturing. Although all of these options can
be applied in principle to satisfy an existing spare part demand, this contribution
focuses solely on remanufacturing processes. Remanufactured parts are considered to
be as-good-as-new and OEMs frequently offer the same warranty as for new parts.
Compared to extra production, remanufacturing is relatively cheap, but since not all
broken parts might be remanufacturable it should be accompanied by other options
to avoid shortages (see, e.g., Inderfurth and Mukherjee, 2008; Inderfurth and Kleber,
2009).
In case of not being able to fulfill occurring spare part demands and in order to avoid
a penalty or a goodwill loss, further options the OEM can offer to his customers range
from swapping to buy-back. Swapping refers to a replacement of the dysfunctional
product with a new generation product free of charge for the customer (as has been
reported by Pourakbar et al., 2008). This option is favorable for high tech products
experiencing a considerable price deterioration between successive product generations
but it is less beneficial for durables. Buy-back of products is typically performed in
practice in form of trade-in campaigns. These campaigns, though, foremost intend to
increase the sales of new products and thus both functional and broken products are
accepted. Although there are many examples from industry (see, e.g., Ray et al., 2005),
an acquisition of recoverable parts for satisfying spare part demands is (at best) seen
as a side effect and is hence not explicitly stated as motivation for such a campaign.
In our study, however, we emphasize the use of more focused trade-in campaigns
which explicitly aim to control the OEM’s supply of recoverable parts. In doing so,
we abstract from the above mentioned sales promoting effects for other products and
isolate the sole effect of buying back broken products on spare parts management.
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In particular, we are interested in those conditions under which buying back broken
products for obtaining spare parts profitably complements the traditional sourcing
options final order and remanufacturing. This could for instance be accomplished by
using the already existing service network which provides the OEM with a direct access
to his customers demanding spare parts.
An active integration of buying back used products into a generic product recovery
system has been examined by Minner and Kiesmu¨ller (2002) in a deterministic setting
with a stationary price-response function. There, the effects of the acquisition decision
on current and future demands are neglected. In our case, however, buying back
would on the one hand decrease current and future demands for spare parts since there
will be no future spare part demand generated from a bought back product. On the
other hand, customers with a dysfunctional product might accept a comparably low
compensation yielding a cheap supply of recoverable parts for the OEM. Therefore,
the trade-off between cannibalizing current and future demands to release oneself from
the obligation to provide spare parts and creating an additional source of supply for
satisfying the remaining demand represents the main focus of this work.
The profitability of the buy-back option depends on constraints on price and quan-
tity decisions but also on the availability of required information. First, the OEM
might be able to approach different customers in a specific way. In the marketing lit-
erature, a number of market-segmentation approaches are discussed (see, e.g., Kotler
and Keller, 2008; Wedel and Kamakura, 2000). Especially, it is argued that one can
segment the market by observable and unobservable characteristics. Observable crite-
ria for segmenting customers are mostly geographic or demographic data. Here, one
might additionally segment on type of relationship, for instance B2B (car rental en-
terprise) or B2C (private customer). Criteria that are unobservable typically contain
psychographic or behavioral characteristics.
Furthermore, the OEM might be restricted in his flexibility to price-discriminate
between customers because of legislation like the Robinson-Patman act in the US. We
refer to Bernstein et al. (2006) for a more comprehensive motivation for simple pricing
schemes. Finally, the OEM might have no control over the buy-back quantity once he
offers a price. This might be the case because he communicates a buy-back campaign in
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the mass-media. Additionally, a quantity restriction of buy-backs for the decentralized
repair shops might not be realizable as the demand at each facility is unknown or
uncertain in advance.
The remainder is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce a basic mathemat-
ical model on how to incorporate buy-backs in the decision-making process and state
its main assumptions. Afterwards, Section 3 analyzes a base case scenario and elabo-
rates possible benefits from segmenting the OEM’s customers into distinct groups. The
fourth section elaborates the critical assumptions made in the basic model and shows
how to adapt it to be able to deal with additional constraints and limited information
availability as described above. Furthermore, the base case parameters set in Section
3 are critically reviewed in a sensitivity analysis. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the
main conclusions and gives some directions for future research.
2 A basic model with buy-back
We consider a single product for which the OEM guarantees the availability of spare
parts during the final phase of service. The planning horizon of length 𝑇 starts at the
end of regular production, i.e. at the time when no further products are manufactured to
be sold. Thus, at this point in time the number of products with the customers (which
we will refer to as the install base) no longer increases. For the sake of simplicity, the
considered product includes only one vital component that can fail and needs to be
replaced by a spare part to restore its functionality. Otherwise, the product’s value
would reduce considerably. Failures occur deterministically with rate 𝜆, i.e. each period
a fraction of the install base requires spare parts to replace the broken components.
This is accomplished by the existing service network operated by the OEM which is
also used to return broken components to a remanufacturing facility.
In this contribution, we focus on the spare parts supply system depicted in Figure
1. The notation used is summarized in Table 1. Demand for spare parts is satisfied
from a central stocking point. Let 𝐵𝑆𝑡 denote the OEM’s spare parts stock at the end
of period 𝑡. The OEM can replenish this inventory using two different options. At the
beginning of the planning period, he places a final order 𝐹𝑂 at unit cost 𝑐𝑓 . Afterwards,
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Table 1: Notation used
Parameters
𝑛 Number of customer segments
𝑇 Planning horizon
𝑐𝑟 Unit cost of remanufacturing
𝑐𝑓 Final order unit cost
ℎ𝑆 Spare parts holding costs per unit and period
ℎ𝑅 Returned products holding costs per unit and period
𝑝𝑖 Reservation price in customer segment i
𝑝𝑠 Revenue per spare part sold
𝑞 Remanufacturing yield rate
𝜆 Components failure rate
𝑟 Interest rate
𝑦𝑖 Initial product stock in customer segment 𝑖
?¯?𝑅0 Initial stock of broken products
𝜈𝑖,𝑡 Percentage of products leaving the OEM’s access of segment 𝑖 in period 𝑡
Decision and state variables
𝐵𝑆𝑡 Spare parts inventory at the beginning of period 𝑡
𝐵𝑅𝑡 Recoverables inventory at the beginning of period 𝑡
𝐹𝑂 Size of the final order
𝑅𝑡 Number of remanufactured parts in period 𝑡
𝐷𝑡 Number of broken products disposed of in period 𝑡
𝐸𝑡 Fulfilled spare part demand in period 𝑡
𝑥𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 Number of broken products bought back from segment 𝑖 at price 𝑝𝑗 in period 𝑡
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 Number of customers in segment 𝑖 in period 𝑡
Θ𝑖,𝑡 Binary pricing variable for customer segment 𝑖 in period 𝑡
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Figure 1: Spare parts supply system
regular production ceases and remanufacturing broken components from the stock of
recoverables𝐵𝑅𝑡 becomes the only sourcing option. The parameters ℎ
𝑅 and ℎ𝑆 represent
the unit holding cost for broken parts and spare parts per period, respectively. In each
period 𝑡, the OEM must decide on the amount of broken components that he would
like to remanufacture 𝑅𝑡 at unit cost 𝑐𝑟 and on the quantity of broken components to
be disposed of 𝐷𝑡. As it is commonly presumed for practical applications, we suppose
that revenues for recovering material and costs of extracting materials are about the
same size which means that the disposal costs are negligible. Due to an imperfect
remanufacturing process only 𝑞% of the remanufactured products fulfill the designated
quality standards to be sold as spare parts. All costs and revenues are discounted by
the interest rate 𝑟.
Both replenishment options exhibit considerable disadvantages. The final order
bears the burden of holding spare parts over a long period of time and the option
of remanufacturing broken parts cannot provide all spare parts demanded due to the
imperfect remanufacturing process. An appropriate way to overcome these deficiencies
would be to include the buy-back of broken products as another option. If the OEM
decides to buy back, he loses a revenue of 𝑝𝑠 per spare part that would be sold otherwise
but he also increases the recoverables stock since an additional broken component
(included in the product bought back) is returned to the OEM. The compensation paid
to the customer to persuade her to sell her broken product depends on her valuation
of the product. For this, we assume that all customers value their product differently,
but this valuation does not change over time. Different buy-back prices, thus, yield
7
different quantities and decisions upon both must be made simultaneously. In contrast
to other approaches (see, e.g., Minner and Kiesmu¨ller, 2002) where a given functional
relationship does not change over time, in our long range approach buy-back decisions
impact the composition of the install base and therefore, change conditions relevant
for later decisions.
For the OEM, individual information upon each customer’s valuation for a broken
product might hardly be obtainable. He therefore segments his customers into groups
𝑖 = 1, ..., 𝑛 in which all customers value their product similarily. The number of
functioning products in each customer segment 𝑖 at the end of period 𝑡 is denoted by
𝑦𝑖,𝑡. It is assumed that the initial size of each segment 𝑦𝑖 is known in advance, and
independent of any of the OEM’s decisions a fraction 𝜈𝑖,𝑡 of all products in a customer
segment 𝑖 leaves the service network as they are, for example, salvaged at a breakers
yard. Let 𝑝𝑖 denote the reservation price of all customers in segment 𝑖 representing their
valuation of a defective product. Without loss of generality, the customer segments are
arranged such that the inequality 𝑝1 < ... < 𝑝𝑛 is satisfied. It is easy to see that only
these prices are relevant for the buy-back decision. If the OEM would propose a price
to a segment that lies between two adjacent reservation prices, he could easily reduce
this price to the lower of the two reservation prices while still being able to acquire the
same quantity.
In an idealized setting (denoted by M1) the OEM can decide for each segment
separately on which quantities he wishes to buy back for which price. This requires,
that the OEM can assign each customer to her segment, i.e. that individual information
is available on all customers. Buy-back quantities are denoted by 𝑥𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 representing the
number of broken products bought back from customer segment 𝑖 at price 𝑝𝑗 in period 𝑡.
Consequently, the amount of broken products that is bought back reduces the number
of spare parts sold in period 𝑡 which will be denoted by 𝐸𝑡. Additionally, the OEM
needs to determine the size of the final order 𝐹𝑂 and in each period 𝑡 he decides on the
number of remanufactured 𝑅𝑡 and disposed of parts 𝐷𝑡. Problem M1 can be formulated
as follows:
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maxΠ1 = −𝑐𝑓 ⋅𝐹𝑂+
𝑇∑
𝑡=1
(1+𝑟)−𝑡
⎡
⎣𝑝𝑠 ⋅𝐸𝑡−𝑐𝑟 ⋅𝑅𝑡−ℎ𝑅 ⋅𝐵𝑅𝑡 −ℎ𝑆 ⋅𝐵𝑆𝑡 −
𝑛∑
𝑖=1
𝑛∑
𝑗=1
𝑥𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 ⋅𝑝𝑗
⎤
⎦ (1)
s.t.
𝐸𝑡 = 𝜆
𝑛∑
𝑖=1
𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 −
𝑛∑
𝑖=1
𝑛∑
𝑗=1
𝑥𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 𝑡 = 1, ..., 𝑇 (2)
𝐵𝑆𝑡 = 𝐵
𝑆
𝑡−1 − 𝐸𝑡 + 𝑞 ⋅𝑅𝑡 𝑡 = 1, ..., 𝑇 (3)
𝐵𝑆0 = 𝐹𝑂 (4)
𝐵𝑅𝑡 = 𝐵
𝑅
𝑡−1 −𝑅𝑡 −𝐷𝑡 + 𝜆 ⋅
𝑛∑
𝑖=1
𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 𝑡 = 1, ..., 𝑇 (5)
𝐵𝑅0 = ?¯?
𝑅
0 (6)
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 ⋅ (1− 𝜈𝑖,𝑡)−
𝑛∑
𝑗=1
𝑥𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 𝑖 = 1, ..., 𝑛 𝑡 = 1, ..., 𝑇 (7)
𝑦𝑖,0 = 𝑦𝑖 𝑖 = 1, ..., 𝑛 (8)
𝑛∑
𝑗=1
𝑥𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 ≤ 𝜆 ⋅ 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 𝑖 = 1, ..., 𝑛 𝑡 = 1, ..., 𝑇 (9)
𝑥𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 0 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, ..., 𝑛 𝑗 < 𝑖 (10)
𝐵𝑆𝑡 , 𝐵
𝑅
𝑡 , 𝐸𝑡, 𝑅𝑡, 𝑥𝑖,𝑗,𝑡, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 ≥ 0 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, ..., 𝑛 𝑡 = 1, ..., 𝑇 (11)
The OEMmaximizes his discounted profit Π1 which includes expenses for producing
the final order as well as each period’s net cash flow consisting of the revenue of selling
𝐸𝑡 spare parts minus the cost incurred for remanufacturing, stock-keeping, and buy-
back. Constraints (2)-(11) are interpreted as follows. The number of spare parts sold
to the customers 𝐸𝑡 is determined in (2) by the number of products that break down
in 𝑡 reduced by the amount of broken products the OEM buys back. Constraints (3)
and (5) are inventory balance equations for the spare parts and recoverables inventory
with initial levels set in (4) and (6). The initial spare parts stock equals the size of
the final order. The stock of spare parts at the end of period 𝑡 𝐵𝑆𝑡 is determined by
the stock at the end of the previous period 𝐵𝑆𝑡−1 reduced by the fulfilled spare parts
demand 𝐸𝑡 plus the yield from the remanufacturing process 𝑞 ⋅𝑅𝑡. Starting from an
initial value ?¯?𝑅0 , the stock of recoverables is reduced in each period by the number of
remanufactured 𝑅𝑡 and disposed of parts 𝐷𝑡 and increases by the number of broken
products that return to the OEM.
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Table 2: Base case parameter values
𝑛 𝑇 𝑦1 𝜈1 𝜆 𝑝𝑠 𝑐𝑓 𝑐𝑟 𝑞 𝑟 ℎ
𝑆 ℎ𝑅 𝑝1
1 80 400 1.5% 10% 10 3 1.5 50% 2.5% 0.2 0.1 20
The development of the number of products in each customer segment is given in
balance equation (7) while (8) represents the initial size of each segment. The segment
size reduces by the exogenous drain of leaving customers 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 ⋅(1− 𝜈𝑖,𝑡) and the total
number of bought-back products from that segment. Constraint (9) ensures that the
number of bought-back products from customer segment 𝑖 must not exceed the number
of broken products in the respective period. By establishing logical constraint (10) it
is guaranteed that no buy-back occurs for a lower price than the segment’s reservation
price. For instance, the OEM cannot acquire any broken product from segment 2 for
the price 𝑝1 since this would not be sufficient. The non-negativity restrictions (11)
assure validity of decisions.
In the idealized setting it can be easily seen that it is not optimal to buy back
products for a different price than the segment’s specific reservation price. Thus, an
optimal solution of M1 will always show 𝑥𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 0 for 𝑖 ∕= 𝑗.
3 The value of buy-back under idealistic conditions
3.1 Base case parameters
In this section, an example is used to illustrate the potential benefit of buying back
broken products and to elaborate the gains of a more detailed customer segmentation.
The respective parameter values of the base case scenario are summarized in Table 2.
We start our analysis with a single customer segment (𝑛 = 1) for which all spare
part demands must be satisfied for the next 80 periods. A period is hereby defined to
be a quarter of a year which means the OEM faces a 20 year planning horizon. The
OEM estimates the initial number of products in the install base to be 𝑦1=400 out of
which a fraction of 𝜈1 = 1.5% are leaving the service network each period. The main
component fails at a rate 𝜆 = 10%, i.e. each product has to be repaired on average
once in two and a half years. Each spare part demand satisfied yields a revenue of
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Table 3: Optimal final order 𝐹𝑂, discounted profit Π, relative profit surplus Δ and
first period in which buy-back takes place 𝑧 in the benchmark solution and M1
Benchmark Optimal buy-back in M1
𝐹𝑂𝐵𝑀 Π𝐵𝑀 𝐹𝑂1 𝑧1 Π1 Δ1
935 2390 658 46 3127 +30.8%
𝑝𝑠=10. The OEM estimates that each broken product can be bought back for a price
of 𝑝1 = 20 being twice the revenue from selling a spare part. Spare parts are procured
by placing a final order at unit cost 𝑐𝑓=3 yielding an initial profit margin of 70%.
All products returning to the OEM will be remanufactured at unit cost 𝑐𝑟 = 1.5. It
is assumed that remanufacturing is successful in 𝑞 = 50% of the cases, i.e. only one
of two broken parts can be used further. Thus, there is no direct cost advantage for
neither parts procured in the final order nor for parts succesfully remanufactured. The
discount rate is set to 𝑟 = 2.5% per quarter or about 10% per year. Out of pocket
holding cost are ℎ𝑆 = 0.2 and ℎ𝑅 = 0.1 per unit and period for spare parts and
recoverable parts, respectively. Taking both discounting and holding cost into account,
it would be economically beneficial to satisfy demand from parts procured in the final
order for at most 20 periods (5 years) and then to switch to remanufacturing. Hence,
the base case parameters depict the situation motivated in the introduction, i.e. the
operations manager is confronted with a much longer final phase than he would choose
individually.
3.2 The value of buy-back without segmentation
By inserting the parameter values into model M1 outlined in Section 2, the optimal
solution was obtained by using the optimization software CPLEX 11 and compared
with a benchmark solution that does not allow for buying back broken products. This
has been accomplished by forcing all buy-back quantities 𝑥𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 to zero. The main results
are shown in Table 3.
The benchmark solution shows a structure where (as has been examined in a related
approach by Kleber and Inderfurth, 2007) there are two phases to be distinguished. In
a first phase (periods 1 to 29) the demand for spare parts is satisfied from the final
11
order of size 𝐹𝑂𝐵𝑀 = 935. All broken parts that return are held in the recoverables
inventory and none is disposed of. In the second phase (periods 30 to 80) the strategic
stock of returned products built up in the first phase is used to serve the entire demand
by remanufacturing broken parts from the recoverables inventory. Thus, the size of the
final order equals that part of total demand over the planning horizon which cannot be
satisfied by remanufacturing. The benchmark solution to the base case scenario yields
a total profit of 2390.
When including the buy-back option, the final order reduces to 658 implying a
substantial reduction in holding cost. Although considerably shorter (the first phase
ends in period 19), both of the above phases are found as well in the optimal solution.
In an adjacent third phase (starting in period 𝑧1 = 46), the OEM buys back as many
products as are needed to satisfy demand. Interestingly, no stock is build up in the
recoverables inventory during that phase since all returns are instantly remanufactured.
Hence, each period’s buy-back quantity is set to just compensate the yield loss. The
discounted profit of the base case scenario increases by about 31% to 3127 when buy-
backs are included. For a detailed description of the policy structure see the Appendix.
3.3 The value of customer segmentation
This subsection broadens the above analysis by allowing the OEM to segment the
install base w.r.t. differences in the customers’ valuation of the product. This analysis
might provide managers with valuable insights on how much effort they should invest
in segmenting the install base.
In order to keep the results consistent, the only difference between customer seg-
ments is the buy-back price. All other parameters remain the same as in the base case,
e.g. the fraction of customers leaving the service network 𝜈𝑖 is kept at 1.5 % for all
segments 𝑖. For determining the segment specific buy-back prices it is assumed that
the willingness to accept a buy-back, i.e. the reservation price, is uniformly distributed
among the 400 customers within an interval between 0 and 20. Given 𝑛 segments,
400/𝑛 customers with the lowest reservation price are assigned to the first segment,
the next 400/𝑛 customers to segment 2, and so on. Each buy-back price, thus, indi-
cates the value for which all customers of a respective segment would sell their broken
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Figure 2: Initial segment sizes 𝑦𝑛𝑖 and corresponding buy-back prices 𝑝
𝑛
𝑖 for different
numbers of segments 𝑛
Table 4: Influence of the number of segments 𝑛 on the final order and discounted profit
𝑛 𝐹𝑂1 𝑧1 Π1 Δ1
1 658 46 3127 +30.8%
2 621 41 3383 +41.5%
4 592 38 3514 +47.0%
8 582 36 3578 +49.7%
16 576 35 3610 +51.0%
32 573 35 3626 +51.7%
64 573 35 3634 +52.1%
products. In the first segment it would be 𝑝𝑛1 = 20/𝑛, in the second one 𝑝
𝑛
2 = 2⋅20/𝑛,
and so on. The segmentation of customers is sketched in Figure 2.
Table 4 depicts the results of the experiments which can be interpreted as follows.
As the solution to M1 can react more flexible, the profitability of the buy-back option
increases as more different segments have been identified. That is because a more
precise fragmentation of the install base allows the OEM to approach each customer’s
actual reservation price. If there is only a rough segmentation of the install base, the
OEM offers some customers too high prices since they would have also sold their broken
product for a much lower price. However, it can be seen that the additional benefit of a
more detailed segmentation does decrease as more different segments are established.
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4 Robustness with respect to critical assumptions
and parameters
This section deals with more realistic conditions than those required for the basic
model. First, we delineate potential problems when approaching customer segments
individually, and assess secondly the impact of such deficiencies on the profitability of
the buy-back option.
4.1 Critical assumptions
While analyzing the model context, a subset of problems can be established that arises
due to possibly existing exogenous constraints, such as communication, information,
and pricing constraints. Communication constraints will be analyzed both from an
external as well as an internal point of view. The internal view refers to an internal
communication within the OEM’s service network. Thus, the OEM is able to approach
each customer individually to offer her a buy-back and has therefore the flexibility to
decide on the quantity he buys back in each planning period. The external view,
on the other hand, corresponds to a setting in which the OEM communicates the
buy-back offer to all customers simultaneously via a mass-media marketing campaign.
As the OEM cannot withdraw his offer, he has to accept all broken products the
customers wish to sell. Whether the communication focuses on his service network or
his customers, thus, determines the OEM’s buy-back quantity flexibility.
The OEM can face furthermore information constraints, if he cannot assign a cus-
tomer to her corresponding segment and does hence not know from which segment he
bought back a broken product. This will typically be the case when the segmentation
is based on unobservable criteria, such as psychological or behavioral characteristics
(see Kotler and Keller (2008), Chapter 8).
Finally, the OEM can face limited pricing flexibility. Pricing constraints describe
the OEM’s restriction to address each segment independently, i.e. his pricing flexibility
is restricted. Therefore, the OEM might be limited to set only one price per period.
In this case, he is not able to buy back products from different segments for different
prices in a given period. Bernstein et al. (2006) discuss reasons why the OEM might
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Table 5: Three dimensions of flexibility and information availability
quantity flexibility
yes no
individual
informa-
tion
available not avail. available not avail.
p
ri
ci
n
g
fl
e
x
ib
il
it
y
yes
full pricing
and quantity
flexibility, full
information
availability
(M1)
no
limited pricing
and full quan-
tity flexibility,
full information
availability
(M2)
limited pric-
ing and full
quantity flexi-
bility, limited
information
availability
(M3)
limited pricing
and quantity
flexibility, lim-
ited information
availability (M4)
be restricted in his pricing format, e.g. the Robinson-Patman act.
These three dimensions, namely pricing and quantity flexibility as well as individual
information availability result in eight subclasses of problems (see Table 5). However,
it can be shown that several subclasses are redundant (shaded cells). First, the OEM
cannot exploit any pricing and quantity flexibility if he cannot assign his customers
to the respective segments (as every customer will apparently claim that she has a
high reservation price). Second, we argue that the OEM is only able to communicate
one buy-back price per period directly to all his customers if the external view of
communication prevails. Hence, if the pricing flexibility acts as an additional constraint
only one case needs to be analyzed regardless the information availability. Because of
the limited buy-back quantity flexibility, the OEM is required to buy back all products
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the customers intend to sell. As the OEM is, by assumption, able to estimate the
total size of each customer segment, he has no advantage of assigning the customers
to the segments since he cannot utilize this information satisfactorily. Yet, there is the
possibility to advertise ‘up-to’ prices. This case, however, could be treated in the same
way as the internal view.
4.2 The economic impact of critical assumptions
In order to assess the economic impact of the assumptions made the model M1 needs
to be adapted. Subsequently, we describe the required changes.
The second setting M2 is characterized by less flexibility than M1 due to its re-
stricted pricing flexibility. This is supported by the fact that only a single buy-back
price can be set in each period. However, in this setting it is still possible to assign each
customer to her segment and to choose which quantity to buy from which customer
segment. The OEM’s pricing decision is described by an additional binary decision
variable Θ𝑖,𝑡 that determines which buy-back price the OEM sets in period 𝑡. It is 1 if
the buy-back price 𝑝𝑖 is offered and 0 else. The following constraints must be added to
M1:
𝑛∑
𝑖=1
Θ𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 1 𝑡 = 1, ..., 𝑇 (12)
𝑥𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 ≤𝑀 ⋅Θ𝑗,𝑡 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, ..., 𝑛 𝑡 = 1, ..., 𝑇 (13)
Θ𝑖,𝑡 ∈ {0, 1} 𝑖 = 1, ..., 𝑛 𝑡 = 1, ..., 𝑇 (14)
Restriction (12) ensures that at most one buy-back price is chosen in a period (or none
if there is no buy-back). Constraint (13) (with 𝑀 being a sufficiently large number) is
required to ensure that products from segment 𝑖 can only be bought back for a sufficient
price which may also be higher than the corresponding segment’s price. Constraint (14)
ensures that Θ can only be 0 or 1. Obviously, due to the additional restrictions imposed
the profit of M2 (denoted by Π2) cannot exceed the profit of M1.
In the third setting M3, the OEM can again only set a single price in each period
and he can also choose upon the quantity to take back. However, the absence of
available information regarding each customer’s assignment results in the problem that
it cannot be easily determined how many items were bought back from which customer
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segment. Hence, further assumptions are required in order to keep track of the number
of customers in each segment. However, it is easy to conclude that the profit of this
setting must lie between the profits of the less restricted setting M2 and the even more
restricted setting M4. A more detailed analysis of this setting will be left for future
research.
Setting M4 provides us with the least flexible environment that still allows for
customer segmentation. Due to its limited pricing flexibility only a single price can
be selected per period, but since this price is externally communicated, all customers
for which the offered price exceeds their reservation price return their dysfunctional
product to the OEM. Constraint (13) must hence be replaced by (15).
𝜆 ⋅ 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑥𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 ≤𝑀 ⋅ (1−Θ𝑗,𝑡) 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, ..., 𝑛 𝑖 < 𝑗 𝑡 = 1, ..., 𝑇 (15)
Constraint (15) captures the fact that for a given buy-back price 𝑝𝑗 (i.e. Θ𝑗,𝑡 = 1) all
customers from segments 𝑖 = 1, ..., 𝑗 − 1 are going to sell their broken products.
By solving the respective optimization problems M2 and M4 for 𝑛=2 segments the
economic impact of the assumptions regarding pricing and quantity flexibility as well
as information availability can be evaluated. In Table 6, the total discounted profits
and the final order sizes are presented for each of the different settings. Interestingly,
while showing in general the same solution structure with three phases as M1, the
third (buy-back) phase of both settings M2 and M4 is characterized by switching price
decisions. While in most periods the low price 𝑝1 is set and broken products from the
first customer segment are bought back only, sporadically the price 𝑝2 is set. In those
‘campaign’ periods a stock of broken products is build up, i.e. more broken products
are bought back than are actually needed to satisfy the current period’s demand. For
a detailed description of the policy structure see the Appendix.
The comparably small gap between M1, M2, and M4 can be explained by the sim-
ilarity of the optimal solution structures. Firstly, it can be observed that the different
assumptions do not influence the size of the final order substantially. Secondly, a vari-
ation in the model assumptions results in changes in the optimal solution structure
that occur quite late in the planning horizon. As all cash flows are discounted, a devi-
ation in one of the later periods does therefore only have a limited effect on the total
discounted profit. Although M3 is not explicitly treated, interpreting the optimal ob-
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Table 6: Total discounted profit, relative deviation from M1 and corresponding final
order sizes.
Benchmark M1 M2 M4
Total discounted profit Π 2390 3383 3358 3343
Relative deviation from Benchmark Δ – +41.6% +40.5% +39.9%
Final order size 𝐹𝑂 935 621 622 626
jective values of M2 as a lower and of M4 as an upper bound of the optimal objective
value analogous results are to be expected for the not explicitly modeled setting M3.
Thus, a main insight from this example is that the OEM can significantly enhance his
performance by including buy-backs into his decision-making process even with only
limited pricing and quantity flexibility and information availability.
Since we only dealt with a single example so far, the following subsection conducts
a sensitivity analysis to provide insights into the robustness of our findings.
4.3 Sensitivity to changing parameters
Taking the base case from Section 3 with two segments as starting point, a sensitivity
analysis is performed that focuses on the question under which parameter combinations
the buy-back option appears to be especially valuable. To achieve this, all relevant
parameters are modified to a considerably higher and lower value while keeping all other
parameters constant. Since we did not find a substantial difference for the settings M2
and M4, we restrict our discussion to a comparison of M1 and the benchmark solution
without buy-back. The corresponding results for M2 and M4 can be found in the
Appendix. Table 7 presents those parameters that seem to have a substantial impact
on the profitability of the buy-back option, i.e. the remanufacturing yield rate 𝑞, the
interest rate 𝑟, the final lot unit cost 𝑐𝑓 , the length of the planning horizon 𝑇 as well
as both holding cost parameters ℎ𝑅 and ℎ𝑆.
These findings can be explained as follows. In the benchmark setting, the spare
part demand can only be satisfied by two options, either by spare parts from the final
order or by remanufacturing. As serving customers close to the end of the planning
horizon becomes more and more expensive, the benchmark solution worsens as the
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Table 7: Optimal final order 𝐹𝑂, discounted profit Π, first buy-back period 𝑧 and rela-
tive profit change Δ in the benchmark solution and M1 for parameters with significant
impact.
Benchmark Optimal buy-back in M1
𝐹𝑂𝐵𝑀 Π𝐵𝑀 𝐹𝑂1 𝑧1 Π1 Δ1
base case 935 2390 621 42 3383 +41.6%
𝑞
40% 1122 836 689 36 2415 +188.7%
50% 935 2390 621 42 3383 +41.6%
60% 748 3821 541 47 4396 +15.1%
𝑟
1.25% 935 4142 758 55 4513 +8.9%
2.5% 935 2390 621 42 3383 +41.6%
5% 935 567 462 29 2287 +303%
𝑐𝑓
1.5 935 3793 724 48 4369 +15.2%
3 935 2390 621 42 3383 +41.6%
4.5 935 986 553 36 2510 +154.4%
𝑇
60 795 3156 628 42 3454 +9.4%
80 935 2390 621 42 3383 +41.6%
100 1039 1644 610 41 3371 +105%
ℎ𝑆
0.15 935 2868 652 45 3604 +25.7%
0.2 935 2390 621 42 3383 +41.6%
0.25 935 1912 587 39 3185 +66.6%
ℎ𝑅
0.05 935 3210 674 47 3816 +18.9%
0.1 935 2390 621 42 3383 +41.6%
0.15 935 1789 576 38 3108 +73.7%
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final order becomes larger compared to setting M1. For instance, this is the case
if the remanufacturing yield rate 𝑞 is low and if the interest rate 𝑟, the final order
unit cost 𝑐𝑓 or one of both holding cost parameters become larger. A larger ℎ
𝑅, for
instance, means that the remanufacturing operations could have started earlier which
reduces the number of spare parts procured in the final order. However, due to its
limited flexibility the benchmark solution cannot react appropriately and is therefore
less profitable than setting M1. Regarding the length of the planning horizon, it can
be said that a longer planning horizon reduces the total profits of the OEM if he does
not account for the buy-back option. In turn, incorporating the buy-back option into
the spare parts fulfillment strategy allows the OEM to offer even longer service periods
while keeping the costs for this additional service at an adequate level.
Table 8 presents those parameters that change the advantageousness of the buy-
back option only slightly, i.e. the outflow rates 𝜈1 and 𝜈2, the buy-back prices 𝑝1 and
𝑝2, and the initial segment sizes 𝑦1 and 𝑦2. It can be seen that a decreasing outflow
from one of the customer segments improves the relative performance of M1 slightly.
This is because the less flexible benchmark solution needs to increase the final order
while M1 can react by buying back more broken products. The influence of buy-back
prices appears to be relatively small as well. The larger one of these prices is, the
smaller the possible gain becomes. The buy-back price effect shows its impact also
when the initial assignment of customers to segments is changed while keeping the
total number of customers constant at 400. If, for instance, the initial install base in
segment one comprises 300 customers while it contains only 100 in the second segment,
the average buy-back price will decrease as 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 remain at 10 and 20, respectively.
Interestingly, the deviation Δ1 remains constant if the number of customers in each
segment is multiplied by the same factor.
Finally, other parameters that do not influence the outcome significantly need to
be mentioned as well. Among these parameters, the failure rate 𝜆 can be found.
The numerical investigation has revealed that a change in the failure rate does not
have a large impact on the profitability of the buy-back option as all decisions are
increased or decreased approximately proportionally. This means that for 𝜆 = 5%
the size of the final order and all subsequent decisions decrease to about half of their
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Table 8: Optimal final order 𝐹𝑂, discounted profit Π, first buy-back period 𝑧 and rel-
ative profit change Δ in the benchmark solution and M1 for parameters with relatively
small impact.
Benchmark M1
𝐹𝑂𝐵𝑀 Π𝐵𝑀 𝐹𝑂1 𝑧1 Π1 Δ1
base case 935 2390 621 42 3383 +41.6%
𝜈1
1% 1020 2222 643 41 3467 +56.1%
1.5% 935 2390 621 42 3383 +41.6%
2% 868 2492 598 42 3305 +32.6%
𝜈2
1% 1020 2222 645 41 3385 +52.4%
1.5% 935 2390 621 42 3383 +41.6%
2% 868 2492 590 42 3368 +35.1%
𝑝1
5 935 2390 595 39 3534 +47.9%
10 935 2390 621 42 3383 +41.6%
15 935 2390 638 44 3249 +36%
𝑝2
15 935 2390 605 41 3456 +44.6%
20 935 2390 621 42 3383 +41.6%
25 935 2390 628 42 3317 +38.8%
(𝑦1/𝑦2)
(300/100) 935 2390 594 40 3495 +46.2%
(200/200) 935 2390 621 42 3383 +41.6%
(100/300) 935 2390 635 41 3256 +36.2%
initial base case values. Furthermore, the cost of remanufacturing one broken product
𝑐𝑟 has no substantial influence. This can be explained by the fact that all broken
products have to be remanufactured if they are not disposed of beforehand. Thus, no
important influence on the buy-back decision can be derived from this parameter. The
corresponding results can be found in the Appendix.
Regarding the other model settings (M2 and M4), the examined numerical examples
reveal that the profit loss from restricted information availability and/or quantity and
pricing flexibility only reacts slightly when one of the parameter values is altered. The
largest loss in total profit that has been observed was 2.7% between settings M4 and
M1 in a situation with a large remanufacturing yield rate 𝑞=60%. However, tendencies
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can be identified. The relative deviation between the profits of M4 and M1 seems
to increase for a small failure rate 𝜆, for a high per unit final lot cost 𝑐𝑓 , and for
comparably large holding costs ℎ𝑅 and ℎ𝑆, respectively. These tendencies could also
be observed when comparing M2 and M1 but on a less prominent scale. For details we
refer again to the Appendix.
5 Conclusions
Due to a high profitability, after-sales management has received an ever increasing at-
tention in the recent past. This study was particularly motivated by the automotive
industry which continues to give long lasting mobility warranties for their cars. These
warranties are obviously an attractive instrument for the marketing and sales depart-
ment while they impose a challenge for the management of spare parts. This study
highlights that buying back broken products is, under certain circumstances which can
be found in practice, an attractive instrument to manage the end-of-life service period,
especially in situations in which options to resupply are limited to placing a final order
and later remanufacturing broken parts.
For different settings regarding the availability of information required for buy-back
as well as limited pricing and quantity flexibility we propose simple MILP models that
are able to find optimal strategies. After evaluating these strategies in a numerical
study we find, that buying back defective products is a beneficial substitute for build-
ing up a large inventory of spare parts at the beginning of the planning horizon by
procuring parts in a final order. It seems that the availability of detailed information
and limitations of pricing and quantity flexibility do not affect the profitability of a
product recovery system with buy-back option substantially. A main reason for this
result can be found in the structural similarities of the optimal policies that could be
observed by numerically examining a representative base case. Interestingly though,
the buy-back is performed in form of campaigns in situations where the pricing flexibil-
ity is limited, i.e. a regular low price buy-back interval is interrupted by single periods
in which a high price is offered to the customers.
It was shown which parameters especially influence the profitability of the buy-
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back option. Here it seems that those parameters which determine the profit impact of
the final order size (like unit production cost and holding cost) seem to be of highest
importance, while the influence of buy-back related parameters like prices show only
limited impact. This is because our benchmark solution without buy-back only shows
small flexibility to react on parameter changes while in the buy-back case, a trade-off is
struck between the final order size and later buying back more or less products. In case
of a high remanufacturing yield rate, the system can be handled like a repair system
(see, e.g., Sherbrooke, 2004) where the buy-back option is less favorable. If the cost
of the employed capital is high, it becomes more and more attractive to reduce the
final order while instead compensating the customers for not fulfilling the spare parts
availability guarantee.
This study is to our knowledge the first attempt to investigate the value of a buy-
back option in a closed loop supply chain for spare parts. There are certainly some
limitations to this study which can be overcome by further research. We limit our anal-
ysis to a MILP formulation which is numerically solved. Even though the numerical
study is restricted to parameters that do not change over time (like e.g. the failure rate
or customer valuation of their product), time dependent parameters can be addressed
as well. General structural properties of optimal solutions could be obtained by using
optimal control methods, as have been successfully applied in product recovery systems
(see Kiesmu¨ller et al., 2004; Kleber, 2006). Complementing our deterministic approach,
a stochastic simulation could be used to evaluate more realistic models involving un-
certainty. Here, due to the high flexibility, buying back broken products becomes an
even more attractive option. Finally, another extension would include the case where
multiple parts are included in a product and thus, the buy-back would yield inflows of
several remanufacturable parts.
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Figure 3: Fulfillment of spare parts demand the benchmark solution
A Appendix
A.1 Detailed discussion of policy structure
In the following, we discuss structural properties of optimal solutions. Since the main
effects are already present when two customer segments are distinguished, we restrict
to that case.
Benchmark without buy back. Figure 3 depicts the optimal solution structure.
Here, total demand for spare parts (the height of each bar) is presented over the entire
planning horizon. Thus, it can be seen that the total demand for spare parts equals to
40 units in the first period. As customers leave the service network, the demand for
spare parts declines over the planning horizon, reaching 31.8% of its first period’s value
in the last period. Since the total demand for spare parts consists of the demand of
two different customer segments, the black line in Figure 3 indicates the first segment’s
demand for spare parts, and the distance between the height of each bar and the
black line depicts the second segment’s demand. Additionally, the color-coded bars in
this figure present the respective source from which the demand for spare parts has
been satisfied. Two phases can be distinguished without buy-back option. In the first
phase (periods 1 to 29) the demand for spare parts is satisfied completely from the
final lot. All broken products that return to the OEM in this phase are immediately
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Figure 4: Fulfillment of spare parts demand in case M1
disassembled and the parts obtained by this procedure are held in the recoverables
inventory and none is disposed of. In the second phase (periods 30 to 80) the strategic
stock of returned products built up in the first phase is used to serve the entire demand
by remanufacturing the recoverables inventory.
M1. In the following, we analyze how this structure changes when the buy-back
option is included. Figure 4 depicts the development of spare part demand in setting
M1 in the case of two customer segments. Although considerably shorter, both phases
of the benchmark solution can be found in the optimal solution of setting M1 as well.
While the first phase consists of 17 periods (from period 1 to 17) in which the entire
spare part demand is satisfied by acquisitions made in the final lot, the second phase
covers 23 periods (from period 18 to 40). In this phase, all demands are fulfilled by
remanufacturing broken products that have been brought to the recoverables inventory
in the first phase. In contrast to the benchmark solution, the recoverables inventory is
not depleted at the end of the second phase. In a third phase (starting in period 41), the
OEM starts buying back from the first segment. These products are remanufactured
instantly and are used to satisfy the current demand if the designated quality standards
are met. The remaining demand which cannot be satisfied by remanufacturing the
bought-back products from the first segment is satisfied by remanufacturing broken
parts left in stock from the second phase. This strategy is followed until the recoverables
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Figure 5: Fulfillment of spare parts demand in case M2
stock is depleted. Then, the OEM buys back from both segments. Interestingly, no
further stock will be build up in the recoverables inventory. Hence, the total buy back
quantity is set to just compensate the yield loss. As the OEM has perfect knowledge
of its customers and can offer each customer an individual buy back price, he will only
procure broken products from the first segment for the buy-back price 𝑝1.
M2. Figure 5 depicts the structure of the optimal solution if the presumption of
full pricing flexibility is lifted, still showing all three phases already explained for the
setting M1. However, quantity and pricing decisions change in the third phase due
to the limited pricing flexibility. In contrast to setting M1, the third phase of setting
M2 is characterized by switching price decisions. While in most periods the low price
𝑝1 is set and broken products from the first customer segment are bought back only,
sporadically the price 𝑝2 is set. In those ‘campaign’ periods a stock of broken products is
build up, i.e. more broken products are bought back than are actually needed to satisfy
the current period’s demand. This strategy is driven by the fact that the OEM wants
to set the price 𝑝2 as low as possible. Yet, the entire demand of the second segment
cannot be satisfied by only using bought-back products from the first segment. Thus,
without stock-keeping the OEM would be forced to set 𝑝2 in every period, which cannot
be optimal.
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Figure 6: Fulfillment of spare parts demand in case M4
M4 The structure of the optimal solution is illustrated in Figure 6. As there is no
quantity flexibility in this setting, the OEM has to buy back all broken products from
both segments if the price 𝑝2 is set, i.e. he pays all customers in segment one a higher
price than their reservation price. The third phase exhibits the same switching pattern
as in setting M2, except the fact that fewer periods can be observed during which the
higher price 𝑝2 is set. This can be explained by the missing quantity flexibility. If the
price 𝑝2 is set, the OEM has to buy back all products from the first and the second
customer segment. Thus, a higher temporary stock is build up in the recoverables
inventory, which lasts longer to fulfill future spare part demands than in M2.
A.2 Results of the sensitivity analysis
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